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India’s investment rate has increased fourfold since 1950 and has risen sharply this decade to 
36% of GDP. But contradictory views have been expressed regarding the importance of this 
investment pattern for India’s economic growth. This paper evaluates the impact of the rise in 
India’s investment rate on its economic growth, using the neoclassical growth model. It finds 
that, although rises in the investment rate and capital accumulation have been strong, the 
increases in the investment rate have added no more than 1.2 percentage points, and perhaps 
as little as 0.7 percentage points, to India’s overall growth rate of GDP per worker of 2.7%. It 
also shows that the current investment boom will have a very small effect on future growth 
rates and that the benefits from further increases in the investment rate are also likely to be 
small.  
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1.  Introduction 
In the last 2-3 years India’s investment rate has burst into the dizzy heights of the East Asian 
miracle, reaching 36% of GDP. Consequently the investment rate has now quadrupled since 1950. 
What impact has this had on India’s growth, and what does the acceleration in investment imply 
about  growth  over  the  next  decade?  In  attempting  to  answer  these  questions,  many  studies, 
including Athukorala and Sen (2002), Bardhan (2006), Basu and Maertens (2007) and Basu (2008, 
2009), have pointed to the key role of investment in understanding India’s past and future growth 
prospects.  
A rather different perspective is given by Bosworth Collins and Virmani (2007). They describe the 
contribution of capital growth as disappointing, and suggest that it has been a constraint on growth. 
This view is reiterated in Bosworth and Collins (2008) where the authors compare India, East Asia 
and  China.  They  argue  also  that  reforms  to  the  business  environment  are  needed  to  improve 
investment growth and capital accumulation.  
Clearly it is disturbing to have two such different views on what would appear to be a simple issue. 
But there appears to be a greater consensus on the policy front. The Economist (2010), Shome 
(2006), Mohan (2008) and Bosworth Collins and Virmani (2007), for example, have all suggested 
that further increases in investment rates are desirable in order to sustain higher growth rates. 
In what follows I aim to clarify how the different views regarding the role if investment arise and 
explain how growth accounting and the pattern of investment rates give such different impressions 
of India’s growth record. I shall argue that, notwithstanding Bosworth et al’s (2007, 2008) muted 
assessment, the pattern of investment and capital accumulation has indeed been very healthy. This 
assessment is based on the neoclassical growth model, rather than traditional growth accounting.   
I shall also argue, however, that a policy focus on further increases in the investment would be 
misguided.  To  see  this  point  one  need  only  recall  Krugman’s  (1996)  satire  of  savings  and 
investment economic policy in Singapore, where he compared it with Stalinist collectivization. Too 
much investment will inevitably mean the funding of projects with poor rates of return. For India 
this may be at the expense of consumption for basic needs and spending on useful social projects.
1 
It follows that, at some level, further increases in investment rates must be harmful. But how much 
is too much? 
                                                              




2. Perspectives on India’s Investment Record? 
India’s recent growth record is a remarkable improvement upon its past. Figure 1 shows an index of 
GDP per capita for India, in logs, since 1950. The graph clearly indicates an acceleration in the 
growth rate since the 1980s. A reasonable consensus is that the growth acceleration began in the 
late seventies or early 1980’s and has been sustained by reforms through the 1990’s (Rodrik, and 
Subramanian 2004, Panagariya, 2004, Virmani 2004, Basu and Maertens 2007, Kotwal et al 2009). 
India’s growth rate of per capita income over the 50 year period, 1950-2000, was 3.2% per year. 
But since 2000 the average growth rate has been 7.2% per year. 
Figure  2  shows  India’s  gross  domestic  savings  rate,  gross  fixed  investment  rate  and  net fixed 
investment rates. It shows a massive increase in savings and investment as a fraction of GDP from 
around 8-9% in 1950-51 to a peak of over 35% of GDP in 2008-09. These savings and investment 
rates compare favourably with the peak savings rates achieved by Japan, the East Asian economies 
and  China  in  each  of  their  respective  economic  miracles.  The  acceleration  in  investment  and 
savings is fairly smooth except for a lull in the reform era of the 1990’s, when rates remained 
relatively constant. Corresponding to the rise in growth rates there is also a clear jump in all series 
since 2000.  
According to Basu (2008) the rises in the savings and investment rates were the most significant 
macroeconomic change  that  occurred  in  India  through  the  1970s.  He  attributes  the  subsequent 
growth in the 1980s to the earlier acceleration in investment rates. Athukorala and Sen (2002) and 
Virmani (2004) attribute this rise in savings to the nationalization of banks in 1969, and the spread 
of branches to rural areas. Bardhan (2006) and Mohan (2008) also note the complementary effects 
of public investment over this period. During the 1980’s the investment rate continued to rise and 
Sen (2007) attributes this to a falling relative price of equipment due to the relaxation of import 
controls and increased access to imported machinery. 
In addition to the acceleration in the investment rate, Sen (2007) argues that the investment in 
machinery and equipment has been associated with embodied technological progress. In his paper, 
“Why did the elephant start to trot?”, he points to correlations between Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) growth and equipment investment in the Indian data, suggesting that investment is a cause 
rather  than  an  effect  of  productivity  growth.  This  builds  upon  a  significant  body  of  literature, 
including  De  Long  and  Summers  (1991)  and  Greenwood  et  al  (1997)  that  stress  the  role  of 
investment spending in generating growth through technological externalities. There is also some 
empirical support for the proposition from prominent studies such as De Long and Summers (1991) 




Nevertheless, the link between equipment investment and productivity growth is much more of a 
hypothesis  than  an  established  fact.  Specifically  the  theoretical  links  between  investment  and 
growth are widely debated. Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and others, for instance, have 
argued that the role of investment or capital accumulation in understanding differences in income 
levels  across  countries,  is  very  small.
2  So,  without  necessarily  discarding  the  link  between 
investment and productivity  growth,  it is useful to  begin  with the more fundamental  issue of 
sorting out how the increasing share of income devoted to investment has impacted on the growth 
rate in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model.  
3. A Balanced Growth Path? 
As  highlighted  in  the  introduction,  the  evidence  of  large  increases  in  the  investment  rate, 
emphasized by Basu (2008) and Sen (2007) and others, contrasts strongly with Bosworth et al 
(2007, 2008), who find only a very modest capital contribution to India’s growth. Specifically the 
data used in Bosworth and Collins (2008) show that between 1978 and 1994, India’s per capita 
output growth was 3.30% and the growth rate of capital was similar, at 3.25%. By comparison, in 
the East Asian average, the capital growth rate was 5.5%, which was much faster than the average 
output growth rate of 3.7%.  
Thus capital accumulation has played a much less prominent role in India’s growth relative to East 
Asia. Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (2007) argue that a poor investment climate, as indicated by 
the World Bank’s Doing Business survey, is responsible for low investment incentives. In particular 
they suggest that a lack of public infrastructure is reducing private investment.  
There is a broad consensus over the woeful state of India’s public infrastructure and many studies 
concur with the need to improve the investment climate (Kochhar et al 2006). Nevertheless there is 
room for dissent as to whether India’s overall investment rate growth really reflects such a dismal 
effort. Specifically Bosworth and Collins’ data show that the growth rates of capital and output are 
approximately the same. This is precisely what one would expect along a steady state growth path. 
It suggests that the rate of capital accumulation was about right! 
3 
                                                              
2 Interestingly, with respect to India, the share of Machinery and Equipment in investment spending has fallen from 
0.59% of investment in 1995-6 to 0.47% in 2007-08. This was precisely when India’s economic growth was 
accelerating. 
3 On a steady state we would have both the growth rate of output per worker and capital per worker equal to the labour 
productivity growth rate 1+g. Hence the so called “capital contribution” from standard growth accounting techniques 
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In contrast East Asia’s faster rate of capital growth means that capital productivity, y/k, is falling. 
This implies that the real rate of return to capital is falling, reflecting Krugman’s (1996) remark that 
“Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore is an economic twin of Stalin’s Soviet Russia.” Thus, though many 
East Asian economies had high savings and investment rates, it is highly debatable that the 40% 
rates of Singapore were necessary, or even desirable. Taiwan and South Korea achieved equivalent 
growth rates with only a fraction of the investment. As shown by Robertson (2000), the growth 
rates in Singapore would have been only marginally less even if it had halved its investment rates.  
So an equally valid interpretation of the data presented by Bosworth et al (2007) might be that 
India’s rate of capital accumulation was about right, and that the East Asian economies and China 
are too high.  
This is not quite right however. The argument that India is, even approximately, on a steady state 
growth path is wrong since a strongly rising investment rate is inconsistent with a steady state. 
Rising  investment  rates,  other  things  equal,  will  imply  higher  growth  rates  of  capital  over  a 
transition and a falling average product of capital, y/k. In particular the standard neoclassical growth 
model implies that a doubling of the investment rates should cause a halving of y/k. Bosworth and 
Collins (2008) data, by contrast, imply a constant y/k, since both the growth rates of capital and 
GDP per worker were approximately equal. To resolve this paradox we need to trace India’s growth 
path  more carefully. Extending  Sen’s  (2007) metaphor, we need to  follow the elephant’s trail, 
looking at how y/k behaved over time. 
4. The Elephant Trail 
I  begin  by  looking  at  Bosworth,  Collins  and  Virmani’s  (2007)  output  and  capital  stock  data.
4 
Figure 3 compares the y/k series based on official data reported in Sivasubramonian (2004), the data 
used by Bosworth Collins and Virmani (2007), as well as the latest series taken from the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI).
5  
It can be seen first that, in the 1978-2004 period, there was considerable fluctuation in the y/k ratio, 
but little net change since 1978.  One might argue that there is significant rise in y/k in the three 
year period 1987-88 to 1990-91. Thus the data show very clearly that the average product of capital 
y/k, has not been falling and, if anything, has been rising.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
is less than the growth rate of GDP then y/k must be rising and the capital contribution will be less than α.. See 
Robertson (2002) for a detailed discussion. 
4 Again I am very grateful to Barry Bosworth who kindly provided me with his data. 
5 In this figure, output is measured as a fraction of GDP at factor cost, measured in constant prices, and k is the net 




What causes y/k to rise, or remain constant, in the face of the strong investment growth? The 
neoclassical growth model suggests three factors, labour force growth, the depreciation rate and 
productivity growth. Specifically let 1+n denote the annual increase in labour inputs, 1+g denote 
the  annual  increase  in  productivity,  measured  in  effective  labour  units,  and  δ denote  the 
depreciation rate on capital. The steady state condition for is  
  ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( / δ − − + + = g n k y s    (1) 
where s is the investment rate.
6 As noted above, a constant value of y/k may indicate a balanced, or 
steady state, if all these variables, s, n, g, δ are constant. A doubling of the investment rate, for 
example, with constant values of n, g, δ, would cause the average product to fall by half. As we 
have seen, this was not the case.  
Alternatively, consider a growing economy like India, where n and δ are approximately constant 
but  g  and  s  are  rising.  A  falling  y/k  ratio  indicates  a  capital  deepening  transition  with  rising 
investment rates. A rising y/k ratio indicates a transition due to higher productivity growth, g. What 
happens to the average product of capital is a balancing act between increases in g and increases in 
s.    
The principal reason why the doubling of the investment rate has not led to a halving of y/k, is an 
acceleration in the rate of productivity growth, g. The average value of productivity since 1950, 
measured in effective labour units, g, has been 2.8%. From 1951-1979, however, the average value 
is 1.4% and from 1980-2008 the average is 4.4%.
7 A simple calculation using (1) shows that this 
three  percentage  point  increase  in  g  is  sufficient  to  raise  the  average  product  of  capital  by 
approximately 50%. The fact that y/k didn’t increase is due to the contemporaneous increase in the 
investment rate, s, which is dragging y/k down. 
Thus India has not been on a steady state, but on a slow transition with rising s and g and an 
approximately constant average product of capital, y/k. This is what lies behind Bosworth et al’s 
(2007,  2008)  results.  The  only  reason  why  the  capital  contribution  was  not  larger,  was  that 
productivity growth was also trending upwards. But strong productivity growth does not mean that 
the investment rate increases have not been important or substantial. 
                                                              
6 I have used the discrete time formula here, to assist with mapping the formula to annual data. Readers may be more 
familiar with the continuous time version,  δ + + = g n k y s / . 
7 Recall that I am measuring productivity growth in effective labour units. The assumed production function is 
α α − =
1 A k y  and  t t A A g / 1 1 + = + . Note that  TFP g = − +
− 1 ) 1 (
1 α  where TFP is the conventionally measured Solow-




There is one caveat, which is to do with depreciation rates. Though productivity growth rates have 
been  rising,  so  too  has  the  implicit  depreciation  rate.  The  net  investment  rate,  calculated  as 
t t t y k k / ) ( 1 − + , has been much more constant over time than the official gross or net investment 
rates shown in Figure 2.
8 Thus the relationship in the data between the gross investment rate and 
changes in the capital stock has not been constant. 
Whether one attaches much importance to this depends on whether one believes that the accounting 
practices in national accounts reflect real economic depreciation or not. But it does help explain the 
different pictures painted by the investment optimists (who refer to gross investment data) and 
Bosworth et al (2007, 2008) (who base their conclusions on the growth rates of capital).
9  
The central insight then is that the increases in investment rates have been large and consequently 
there has been a high rate of capital accumulation. With a constant rate of productivity growth, at 
any level, the increases in the investment rate would have caused the average product of capital to 
fall sharply. Because the rate of productivity growth was also accelerating, however, the growth rate 
of capital remained fairly close to the growth rate of output. This pattern of growth ensures that the 
growth accounting “capital contribution” will be close to the assumed capital share and that y/k 
remains fairly  constant.  But  this  in  itself  does  not  mean  that  the  investment  process  has  been 
restricted or is inadequate.  
5.  India’s Investment Boom: How Much is Too Much? 
We have seen that the “capital-contribution” in growth accounting results depends on both the 
investment  rate  and  the  rate  of  productivity  growth.  It  does  not  tell  us  how  the  change  in  a 
potentially interesting policy variable, the investment rate, affects the growth rate. This, however, 
would seem to be a useful way of approaching the issue of evaluating the role of the increases in the 
investment rate. To do this we need a growth theory. As above, the most useful starting point is the 
standard textbook Solow-Swan or Ramsey neoclassical growth model.  
In the Solow-Swan growth model an increase in investment from s to  s′ on the growth rate of per 
capital income is 
) 1 /( ) / ( /
α α − ′ = ′ s s y y , where α is the income share of capital, and  y′ refers to the 
new steady state level of per capital income. Thus, with a capital income share of α=1/3, we have 
                                                              
8 A similar picture emerges if one compares RBI capital consumption rates with capital stock estimates. The 
comparison suggests that the depreciation rate has risen from around 2%  to 4% since the early 1950’s. 
9 It is straightforward to construct an alternative capital series using the gross investment rates and assuming a constant 
depreciation rate. In this alternative series the y/k increases until 1965, then falls steadily during the 1970’s and 1980’s  




5 . 0 ) 1 /( = −α α .
10 This means that to double GDP per capita we need to quadruple the investment 
rate. India’s investment rate has indeed quadrupled since 1950, from 9% to 36% of GDP. But 
income per capital over this period has increased 5-fold. Over 58 years that translates to a growth 
rate of 1.2% per year due to investment rate growth relative to the average growth rate of GDP per 
worker of 2.8%.  
This, however, is an overestimate since the changes in investment are gradual and the peak rate has 
only reached in the last few years. With a convergence rate of 5% only half of this increase in GDP 
per capita from a given increase in the investment rate is realized after 14 years, and only ¾ of it 
would be realized after 28 years. Hence the total contribution of increases in the investment rate to 
India’s GDP per capita growth since 1950 is likely to be closer to half of this amount. Indeed 
simulations suggest that the growth contribution is around 0.75 percentage points of India’s 2.7% 
growth rate of GDP per worker, or 28% of India’s overall growth.
11  
This reduced figure still suggests that investment has been very important. But it also emphasizes 
that the gains from investment rate rises are distributed over a long period so its impact on growth 
rates over several decades is modest.  
In this decade India’s investment rates have increased from 25% to 36% of GDP. This is a similar 
absolute increase to what was achieved over 30 years from 1960-1990. However, the effect of a 
change in the investment rate on the growth rates depends on the percentage changes, and not the 
absolute change. Thus increasing the investment rate from 25% to 36% only implies a 1.2-fold, or 
20%, increase in per capita incomes over a full transition.
12  
With a half life of 14 years, this change in the rate of investment implies a 10% increase in income 
levels  over  14  years,  or  approximately  0.7%  per  year  between  2000-2014.  Though  0.7%  is  a 
significant number, it will only account for a small fraction of the India’s growth in the near future 
growth rates of around 6-7% per year.  
Thus the neoclassical growth model suggests that each percentage point rise in the investment rate 
has an increasingly smaller effect on the income level and on the growth rate over a transition.
13 
                                                              
10 An identical result holds in the Ramsey growth model for any parameter that affects the steady state investment rate, 
such as a tax on investment.  
11 The results are sensitive to the assumed capital share however. A capital share of 0.4 would significantly increase the 
role of investment, though it would still account for much less than half of India’s economic growth.  
12 That is,  22 . 1 ) 24 / 36 ( /
2 / 1 = = ′ y y  
13 Of course these conclusions are based firmly on the assumptions of an aggregate production function. An alternative 




Hence further increases in the investment rate must play an increasingly diminishing role in India’s 
growth. 
6.  Conclusion 
Despite the stratospheric investment rates of recent years, the picture that emerges for India is that 
rising productivity has been the key ingredient of economic growth. Specifically the lack of change 
in the capital-output ratio, or it inverse y/k, is not due to a lack of capital deepening, but to an 
acceleration in the productivity growth rate. This gives cause to reconsider Bosworth, Collin and 
Virmani’s (2007) gloomy assessment of India’s record on capital accumulation.  
But one may also take issue with the upbeat assessment of investment. Can further increases in 
investment really keep the elephant trotting? Perhaps inauspiciously, recent research shows that 
Asian Elephants can’t actually run in a technical sense. They are simply too big and heavy.
14 The 
metaphor is apt since the neoclassical model also suggests that adding capital without productivity 
growth will cause India to stumble under the weight of a large and inefficient capital stock.  
The four-fold increase in the investment rate from around 9% to 36% of GDP has produced some 
significant growth over the post independence era. But with an investment rate now above 30%, a 
similar percentage increase in the investment rate is impossible. What has made the difference for 
India,  especially  recently,  is  that  the  higher  investment  rates  have  been  supported  by  higher 
productivity  growth.  Incremental  increases  in  the  investment  rate  are  unlikely  to  generate  any 
further significant growth benefits. Hence productivity growth, and not investment, will dominate 
India’s growth over the coming decades.  
 
                                                              
14 Rather, they just walk fast without the necessary vertical oscillation to really get up speed. For a further discussion of 
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